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Abstract 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) has been politically the most influential religious 
organization in Indonesia since its initial establishment in 1975. By issuing a series 
of fatwa, this organization has religiously encouraged Indonesian Muslim to behave 
and take any decision within their life in accordance with Islamic stipulation based 
on the institutional interpretation. Though known and widely accepted as legal 
opinion on religious issues, one of among the most controversial fatwa recently 
issued by the MUI was, in fact, related to the civil participation in the last but most 
contentious general election. The fatwa theologically declared a religious status of 
being abstain (golput) in the election; that is religiously disallowed (haram). By 
referring to the statistic data of golput, it is shockingly evidenced that the fatwa has 
somehow influenced Muslim voters to use their civil rights properly in this 
presidential election.Considering those startling facts, this paper aims to see how 
religious precepts are efficaciously employed by MUI to endorse the democratic 
system of Indonesia. Through broader analytical observation on the dynamic of 
MUI‟s political movement in the light of Menchikian periodization of MUI‟s authority, I 
argued that modern strategies, such as those including mass mobilization, lobbying, 
and coercive power, are currently applied to claim their authority amid Indonesian 
society.  
Keywords: MUI, modern authority, fatwa, election, religious democracy 
Abstract 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) secara politis adalah organisasi keagamaan paling 
berpengaruh di Indonesia sejak didirikan pada tahun 1975. Dengan mengeluarkan 
serangkaian fatwa, organisasi ini secara religius mendorong Muslim Indonesia 
untuk berperilaku dan mengambil keputusan dalam hidup mereka sesuai dengan 
Ketentuan Islam berdasarkan interpretasi kelembagaan. Meskipun dikenal dan 
diterima secara luas sebagai pendapat hukum tentang masalah-masalah agama, 
salah satu fatwa paling kontroversial yang baru-baru ini dikeluarkan oleh MUI, 
pada kenyataannya, terkait dengan partisipasi sipil dalam pemilihan umum terakhir 
namun paling kontroversial. Fatwa secara teologis menyatakan status agama 
sebagai abstain (golput) dalam pemilihan; yang dilarang agama (haram). Dengan 
merujuk pada data statistik golput, sangat mengejutkan dibuktikan bahwa fatwa 
tersebut entah bagaimana memengaruhi pemilih Muslim untuk menggunakan hak-
hak sipil mereka dengan benar dalam pemilihan presiden ini. Mempertimbangkan 
fakta-fakta yang mengejutkan itu, makalah ini bertujuan untuk melihat bagaimana 
ajaran agama digunakan secara efektif oleh MUI untuk mendukung sistem 
demokrasi Indonesia. Melalui pengamatan analitis yang lebih luas tentang 
dinamika gerakan politik MUI dalam kaitannya dengan periodisasi Menchikian 
terhadap otoritas MUI, saya berpendapat bahwa strategi modern, seperti yang 
termasuk mobilisasi massa, lobi, dan kekuatan koersif, saat ini diterapkan untuk 
mengklaim otoritas mereka di tengah masyarakat Indonesia. . 
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Introduction 
MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/Indonesian Council of Ulama) has 
been politically the most influential religious organization in Indonesia 
since it was established in 1975. By issuing a series of fatwa, this 
organization has religiously encouraged Indonesian Muslim to behave and 
take any decision within their life in accordance with Islamic stipulation 
under the institutional interpretation. This is relatively effective in terms of 
decorating the political arena with religious values on which Indonesia has 
been initially built by the founding leaders. Soekarno once said that every 
religious follower should worship their own God and implement their 
religious teachings piously as the state of Indonesia should be a state 
incorporating Belief in God (Yamin, 1959: 77-78). 
Accordingly, this organization was aimed to strengthen religious 
society in a way that is explained by Pancasila as the state foundation in 
order to assure national resilience, to include the participation of ulama in 
national development, and to maintain social harmony among religious 
followers in Indonesia (Bruinessen, 1996: 30). However, its position as a 
religious organization that is recently regarded as exercising a close 
relationship with the existing government put their fatwas in a debatable 
status. Based on his observation on the fatwa council of Al-Azhar, Agrama 
(2012: 163-165) argued that the fatwa is religiously binding when it comes 
to personal idealization but it is not when it comes to political and market 
affairs which were already fulfilled by political interests.  
A most controversial fatwa was recently issued by the MUI with 
regard to the general election. The fatwa contains a religious status of 
being abstain in the election by which more or less it means that golput 
(abstain) is religiously disallowed (haram). As one of among five 
terminologies in Islamic law, haram basically means that if you do not 
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perform something religiously obliged, you will gain a religious sanction but 
if you do that sincerely, the reward will be available for you. By associating 
golput with the notion of haram, this fatwa is expected to religiously 
delegitimize the abstain position among Indonesian Muslim citizens and 
encourage them to vote in the coming election. 
Interestingly, by referring to the data of golput in 2019 presidential 
election based on a quick count conducted by the Indonesian Survey 
Institute (LSI) and the data on previous election conducted by General 
Elections Commission (KPU), it shows that the number of golput in this 
year is significantly decreased. Given a number of relatively current 
political incidents sparked by a fatwa, it is not overstated to claim that the 
religious fatwa of MUI might potentially influence Muslim voters to use their 
civil rights properly in general election. Statistically speaking, the number 
of golput in 2019 election constituted only 19.24%. This percentage 
confronted the increasing trend of golput since the first election of post-
reformation, which according to KPU constituted 23.30% in 2004 election, 
27.45% in 2009 election, and 30.42% in 2014 election. By no means of 
underestimating other possible reasons, those data could explain the 
extent to which the dynamic of voters is influenced by religious discourse. 
Unlike other preceding fatwas, this is issued in a moment when one 
of its leaders is participating in the coming election. That is one among the 
reasons because of which the fatwa is fiercely contested and questioned 
by many scholars as well as politicians. Some of them believed that 
political motives, rather than religious reasoning, has been underlying the 
fatwa. To respond the critics, MUI argued that the fatwa has been 
internally discussed an issued in accordance with the Consensus of Ulama 
at Padang Panjang, West Sumatra, in 2009. The Vice General Secretary 
of MUI, Amirsyah Tambunan, stated that the consensus was based on 
Islamic teaching with regard to the religious obligation on voting when 
Islamic requirements were fulfilled by all or one of the candidates; religious 
piety, integrity, trustworthy, aspirative, and political capability. These 
requirement should basically be fulfilled when someone nominate himself 
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as a candidate of president for he/she was selected based on Indonesian 
constitution that is regarded as being parallel with Islamic teaching. 
Nevertheless, instead of focusing on the controversy above, my 
paper is aimed to see how religious precepts is employed to endorse the 
democratic system of Indonesia by observing the MUI‟s particular fatwa on 
being abstain in general election. This question will be followed by a 
further observation on the efficacy of the employment by proposing the 
question of „why‟. This issue is worth analyzing by considering threefold 
facts; first, fatwa is normally understood as religious practices that is not 
legally binding, second, general election is one of political elements 
profoundly required by a state in which democracy is applied, and finally, 
the question of how the two facts is politically displayed in a country that is 
relatively seen as secular. 
Discussion 
Religion and Democracy: Beyond Secularism 
In a workshop organized by Indonesian Youth‟s Hopes (HPI) on the 
role of Indonesian youth as an agent of peace in which I have been invited 
as a participant, most of the speakers talked about the significance of both 
nationalism and religiosity in the youth‟s personality. Those senses are 
concomitantly supposed to be cultivated within themselves since their 
early years. As one of the speaker representing FKUB, Ki Demang 
Wangsafyudin argued that nationalism without religiosity will be trapped in 
a vacuous ideology while religiosity without a sense of nationality will only 
produce a separatist movement. This argument however fit the notion of 
godly nationalism proposed by Jeremy Menchick (I will come to it later). 
However, given that Indonesia is one of democratic countries, the problem 
is that the common inclination to associate the secularity with democracy. 
This inclination will disrupt every attempt to understand the relation 
between religion and state in Indonesia and how the second, in light of 
democracy, treat the diversity of the first. 
Therefore, those two paradigms will be located in different analytical 
boxes for the rest of this paper in order to achieve a comprehensive 
MUI And Its Fatwas: The Articulation of Modern Authority In a 
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understanding on the religious endorsement in Indonesian political 
context. In fact, many scholars have argued that secularism is not 
necessary for democracy. Alfred Stepan, in Rethinking Secularism (2011: 
115), cited at least three scholars who won the Nobel Prize of Political 
Science, Robert Dahl, Arend Lijphart, and Juan L. Linz, to demonstrate the 
irrelevance of secularism with any discussion of modern democracy. 
Neither Dahl nor Lijphart mentions secularism in their analysis on the long-
standing democracy in the modern world. Meanwhile, Linz and Stepan 
himself have decided not to use this concept in their categorization of five 
major different regime types in the world, considering that all types call 
themselves secular. 
In addition to that, many theorists in sociology of religion suggested 
the same argument by declaring the death of secularism. In their critical 
style, Stark and Finke (2000: 57) referred to secularism as an obsolete 
paradigm that must be put into grave. They asserted that the emergence 
of religious pluralism in many parts of the world is seemed to supersede 
the monopoly of older religious paradigm without leading to secularizing 
trends. In fact, according to Gooren (2006: 40), religion is still alive and 
well all over the world as a structure for meaning-making, as the basis for 
individual or group morality, and, of course, as the foundation for various 
political movements, especially in their Christian, Muslim, and Hindu 
variants. 
In this regard, Indonesia becomes a model for a state that adopted 
democratic system without being totally secular, if not non-secular at all. 
Based on twenty-four months of his field research in Indonesia, Menchik 
(2016: 72) identified the country as a godly nationalism, “an imagined 
community bound by a common, orthodox theism and mobilized through 
the state in cooperation with religious organizations in society”. In the 
context of Indonesia as a Muslim majority country, those civil organizations 
are mostly represented by Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as 
two largest Islamic organizations. Rather than articulating the language of 
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secularism, their goal is basically to see religious values and education, 
particularly belief in God, incorporated into social and political life. 
Notwithstanding their vision has been accommodated in the first 
principle of state foundation (Pancasila), they remained struggle afterward 
for practically political participation. However, it was only under the regime 
of Soeharto that they were given an institution to ensure that their goal is 
going to be fulfilled. This historical narrative challenge a one-line 
argumentation on the aim of MUI‟s establishment that it was designed only 
by the existing government to “co-opt, fragment, and neutralize Islam as 
an autonomous political force, regulate associational life, and ensure mass 
turnouts for (the political party) Golkar at election time” (Porter, 2002: 76). 
In fact, in the side of civil religious society, this religious organization 
functioned as well as their political vehicle in influencing the process of 
decision-making of the state. 
The Dynamic of MUI’s authority 
As a religious organization covering almost all religious matters of 
Indonesian Muslim, MUI exercises a unique authority that is transformed 
from period to period. The change of political situation is the foundation on 
which the authority is reformulated in order to adjust to the current context. 
This is one of their institutional strategies to preserve their legitimacy and 
monopoly over religious life of society. In his presentation at the 2018 
meeting for the Association for Asian Studies and the Gatty Lecture Series 
at Cornell University, Menchik distinguished three periods in the history of 
MUI to demonstrate that in each era its authority is exerted in distinct 
mechanism with regard to the fatwas it issued.  
The first period is started from 1975 to 1990. In this period, MUI 
was essentially a model of state corporatism, established by Soeharto to 
control the authoritative power of ulama outside the political parties. It was 
created in a way that those parties were amalgamated into an Islam-based 
Unity and Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembanguan, PPP) to put 
a control upon them. This particular party was later expected to 
consolidate the power as well as to neutralize the opposition. Therefore, 
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their power is still limited as they were ideologically born through political 
considerations, which consequently positioned them under the state 
power. 
This might be well evidenced by its 1984 fatwa against Ahmadiyah 
that has a little effect due to the less concern of the existing regime with 
the issue of religious heterodoxy than national development. Some of their 
fatwas were even opposed by the Soeharto for it was considered as 
contradicting the state policy, such the fatwa that encourage Muslim to not 
attending Christmas celebrations. This powerlessness was caused by the 
type of authority in this period that is still based on a charisma of their 
religious leaders such as Hamka (Muhammadiyah), Syukri Ghozali (NU), 
and Hasan Basri (Muhammadiyah), and its association with the state. 
The second period, started from 1990 to 2005, was marked with the 
project of halal food certification and Islamic banking. These programs 
showed the institutional expansion under its two prominent leaders, Ali 
Yafie (NU) and Sahal Mahfudz (NU). Their authority is no longer limited to 
religious affairs but covered also public. It is stated that “in the case of the 
halal certification industry, as for Islamic banking, some MUI fatwas now 
have legal status as enforceable regulatory instruments of state” (Lindsey, 
2012: 268). Therefore, this period gave them a favor not only in terms of 
strengthening their authority but also provide them a source of funding. 
Their alliance with ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in 
the early 1990s underpins the statement. They were formal as well as non-
formal relationship between both organizations that suggested enduring 
legacy of Suharto‟s emboldening of political Islam.  
Given those two official programs upon which MUI relies its power, 
they employed a regulatory authority as a result of administrative 
regulations and parliamentary law. By referring to a legal scholar, Tim 
Lindsey, Menchik portrayed MUI in this period as a QUANGO, a quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organization. According to him, this term is 
derived from British and American tradition to describe state-financed 
organizations that are responsible for their own board of directors. As the 
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organization became more powerful, they began contesting the state 
authority by opposing some of its policies, particularly when the state was 
led by a very charismatic NU leader, Abdurrahman Wahid (also well 
known as Gus Dur), in some of which they won the case. 
The third period is the last and current phase in which fatwa on 
golput was issued. Starting from 2005 to the present, this period is 
acknowledged as a conservative turn of MUI‟s authority precisely after the 
process of state democratization. Nevertheless, their theological attitude 
toward religious sects such as Ahmadiyah is more or less static as it was 
in New Order era. The difference lies only in the type of mechanism they 
used in exerting its authority; if they used charismatic authority of their 
prominent figures during the New Order, today they mobilizes the mass 
and lobbies the state in order to gain a massive and legal support as well 
as assuring that their fatwas are applicable. In doing so, one of their 
partners in the field that has helped them very much is FPI (Islamic 
Defenders Front), a vigilante group that mostly used violent acts to 
campaign their vision. In one of his article, Wilson described their 
reciprocal relation as: “FPI uses MUI‟s fatwa to legitimize violent 
vigilantism such as its attacks on the Ahmadiyah sect, while MUI uses this 
violence to justify the need for its fatwa to be followed in order to ensure 
„religious harmony‟” (Wilson, 2008: 205). 
Theoretically speaking, fatwa in Islamic legal theory refers to a 
response to a specific religious question asked of a mufti with regard to an 
actual situation (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996: 4). Based on that 
definition, fatwa is basically issued only when it is required or asked to 
answer a particular question on religious matters. In general, according to 
Ma‟ruf Amin himself, one of MUI‟s leaders who is contesting in presidential 
election as Jokowi‟s vice president, fatwa is characterized with two main 
features; (a) it is responsive as a legal answer issued after the requirement 
of a fatwa petitioner (mustafi) and as an answer, (b) it is not legally 
binding. Those mustafi, be it is individual, communal or institutional, do not 
need to obey the fatwa given to them (Amin, 2008: 20). 
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However, as the time goes on, its procedure on production and 
mechanism is also transformed in appropriation with social and political 
context. In the case of MUI, for instances, it started to give fatwas, whether 
requested or not, precisely after 2000. By showing a graphic on the 
number of fatwas, Muhammad Maulana Hamzah (2017: 142) argued that 
fatwa is more productively issued after reformation rather than during the 
New Order. Many of them have been produced with regard to socio-
cultural, politics, interreligious relation, religious sects, commodity and so 
on. Fatwa on golput is one of their fatwa recently issued to respond the 
increasing trend of abstain position in general election. This position is 
regarded as politically harmful for a state under the process of 
democratization such Indonesia.  
Mass Mobilization: A Modern Model of Religious Authority 
Out of three mechanism of modern religious authority, mass 
mobilization is the most visibly trait embedded in MUI‟s political power. Its 
cooperation with several vigilante groups in the field such as FPI, MMI 
(Indonesian Mujahidin Council), and HTI (Indonesian Liberation Party) 
provide them a larger room to express their authority by mobilizing civil 
support. As the result, some of their fatwas, including the fatwa on golput, 
are applied in social and political context. 
In the study of social movement, Moss and Snow (2016: 547-569) 
recently identified three main stages in the process of mass mobilization; 
emergence, dynamics, and outcomes. Using a different terminologies, 
Goldstone (1998) also proposed a three-level and three-stage comparison 
of „causes,‟ „mobilization,‟ and „outcome‟ in the literature on social 
movements and revolutions. These stages are useful in analyzing the 
MUI‟s tactic in mobilizing the mass to socially legitimize their fatwas‟ 
authority. 
In the case of Basuki Djahja Purnama (also well known as Ahok), a 
Chinese Christian who is used to be a governor of Jakarta and recently 
jailed for being accused as performing religious blasphemy, mass 
mobilization is massively and regularly implemented to demand the state 
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of sending the governor to the jail. Notwithstanding many attempts to bring 
the case into the issue of politics, the religious nuance is very much 
sensed in that MUI-backed situation. To follow the stage sequence 
proposed previously by Moss, Snow, and Goldstone, this case is started 
with a cause of emergence, followed by the dynamic of mobilization, and 
ended with several outcomes. 
Ahok‟s speech in Seribu archipelago ignited Muslim resentment all 
across Indonesia. He quoted one of Qur‟anic verses to attack his 
opponents, according to whom he cannot be a governor for he is a non-
Muslim citizen. Their interpretation on the verse disallows them to choose 
a non-Muslim to be their leader. This understanding was regarded by Ahok 
as politically exploited to garner support from Muslim voters. His statement 
is immediately accused as containing a particular element of religious 
blasphemy for which he should be sentenced as a consequence. This 
demand found its legal substratum in the fatwa of MUI shortly after which it 
was issued and decided that Ahok‟s words had indeed been blasphemous. 
To make sure that the fatwa is implemented, an alliance called the 
National Movement to Defend the MUI Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional 
Pengawal Fatwa-MUI, GNPF-MUI) was established, with Rizieq Shihab 
(the leader of FPI) leading the advisory council and Bachtiar Nasir (a 
former central official of MUI) as head. 
This incident is then followed by a series of ever larger mass 
demonstration in the surrounding of National Monument (Monas), Jakarta, 
co-organized mainly by GNPF-MUI, FPI, HTI, and Wahdah Islamiyah 
(another like-religious oriented Islamic organization led by Muhammad 
Zaitun Rasmin), without ignoring involvement of other elements. The 
movement was called an Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam), 
demanding Ahok to be arrested. The first was performed on October 14, 
2016 and drew a few thousand. The second was on 4 November (also 
known as 411 movement), with possibly 300,000 protestors and 
accompanied by some rumors of financing by Ahok‟s political rivals. The 
police, hoping to deflate the movement and avert violence, declared Ahok 
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a suspect. But the Islamists and their political backers saw the opportunity 
for ensuring Ahok‟s downfall, and announced a third rally for 2 December 
(also known as 212 movement). Some 750,000 activists brought the 
capital to a standstill, and the government announced that Ahok‟s trial 
would begin immediately. In this sense, the political motive was started 
visibly observed. 
As an outcome, they won the case and gained what they have 
demanded politically and aspired religiously; on April 19, 2017, Anies 
Baswedan won the second round with almost 58 per cent of the vote 
against Ahok‟s 42 per cent and on 9 May, Ahok was convicted of 
blasphemy and sentenced to two years in prison. 
The Modern Authority of Fatwa on Golput: A Religious Endorsement 
of Democracy 
In Islamic epicentrum, Muhammad is a central figure who is 
modeled by every Muslim all across the place and time regardless of the 
Islamic sect she/he is associated with. Both Shi‟a and Sunni as two largest 
streams in Islamic history give him a remarkable honor. All of his 
characters should be imitated by those who are Muslim. In the matters of 
political management and leadership, he is best known in Islamic 
literatures as carrying out four noble qualities; amanah (trustworthy), sidiq 
(reliable), tabligh (aspirative), and fathonah (politically educated). 
Considering these prophetic characters and the need to have a leader in a 
social life, MUI issued a fatwa on discouraging Muslim citizens to be 
abstain in general election in which an ideal leader is contested. According 
to them, as long as there is a leader candidate among the contestants who 
fit the prophetic requirements, voting become a religious compulsory.  
In the context of Indonesia, they argued, every contestant is 
supposed to have been already fitted to the requirements since Indonesian 
constitution is basically formulated by basing on religious values. In other 
word, those who are not conforming to Islamic values will not pass the 
constitutional selections. Therefore, voting must be obliged in each 
general election since the beginning of Indonesian history. In fact, 
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according to Muhyiddin Junaidi, the chair of foreign relation and 
international cooperation of MUI, this fatwa has been discussed in 2009, 
the first decade of Indonesian democratization, and latter produced and 
effectively influenced the voters in 2019 election under Syamsuddin‟s 
leadership as the third period of MUI‟s power. This fact showed that the 
fatwa is basically employed by MUI to endorse the democracy that is 
effective only by employing modern type of religious authority. 
Three model of mechanism in modern authority will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs to understand the efficacy of the fatwa in 2019 
general election that is participated by Joko Widodo (an incumbent) and 
Prabowo Subianto (a military-based); those mechanism are including 
mass mobilization, state lobbying, and coercive authority. Before going to 
that discussion, notice that this paper focused only on the religious 
endorsement by MUI on giving a vote in election without including their 
position in the coming election. This is not only because their current 
dilemma in deciding their position given that their leader is joining Jokowi‟s 
party who is deemed as less religiously adjusted than Prabowo, but also 
because as a public institution representing all layers of Muslim society 
they are morally demanded to be neutral in the arena of contestation. 
The first model is essentially a continuation of previous 
demonstration of Ahok case with the same actors and venues but different 
in scale and goal. On December 2, 2018, they organized what so called a 
reunion of 212 alumni that is claimed as attended by a thousand of alumni 
and non-alumni from all elements of Indonesian society. Interestingly, this 
agenda was attended also by BPN (National Winning Agency) of 
Prabowo‟s party that creates a rumor among Jokowi‟s proponents that this 
movement has been no longer religious but transformed into political. In 
the context of political contestation, this is not impossible by suggesting 
that each contestant and his/her supporters will compete with each other 
even far before the election is performed to fight for a space to campaign 
as well as to mobilize civil support as much as possible. Meanwhile, in the 
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view of MUI, this massive audience is potentially mobilized to participate in 
the coming election by deciding and giving their votes. 
The second model is lobbying the next government through the 
candidate of president as it is important to ensure the future of their 
authority. In the side of Jokowi, they send one of their charismatic leaders, 
Ma‟ruf Amin, to couple with him in the throne of presidency. Regardless of 
a quite huge controversy following his candidacy, this is one of their 
political strategy to keep the legitimacy of their fatwa safe in the future – 
notice that Amin is a former head of fatwa commission in the body of MUI 
under whose leadership it issued some controversial fatwa including fatwa 
against Ahmadiyah. 
In another side, they crafted a written deal with Prabowo in a so 
called Integrity Pact of Ulama Consensus II (Pakta Integritas Ijtima‟ Ulama 
II). The pact consists of seventeen demanded point that must be approved 
by Prabowo to gain their support. The last point sounds: “Respecting the 
position of ulama and desire to consider the argument of ulama and other 
religious leaders in resolving any problem related to state and social 
prosperity.” This specific point is their attempt to save their authority. 
As it was named in the previous paragraph, Ulama Consensus has 
been organized three times since the outset of this political contestation. 
Given the complexity of the consensus, it needs a specific research to 
discuss and analyze them in detail. However, they will be captured briefly 
in this final chapter only to show how the dimension of coercive authority 
was also displayed in this case. 
In the history of Islam, Ulama Consensus is conducted in response 
solely to the religious problem, particularly after the demise of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The output is conceptually called Ijma, defined as the 
unanimous agreement of the jurists of the Muslim community of any period 
on any matter (Kamali, 2000: 169). Its position in Islamic legal resources is 
after Qur‟an and Hadits and before Qiyas (analogical reasoning). They are 
best known as four legal resources commonly referred by Muslim in all 
places and histories. As one of among for main resources, it is supposed 
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to religiously binding upon which all Muslim should put their compliance. 
Those who do not obey the communal agreement will be religiously 
condemned as conducting a sin. 
Interestingly, this agreement was made by some Ulama of 
Indonesia (including GNPF-MUI) in regard to the political matters. 
Sequentially, it was held firstly on July 27-28, 2018 to find an appropriate 
person to be recommended as Prabowo‟s mate in presidential struggle. 
Two prominent names were mentioned; Salim Segaf al-Jufri (the Head of 
Advisory Council of Prosperous Justice Party) and Ustadz Abdul Somad 
(the most prominent Islamic preacher). The second was organized a 
month after to create an Integrity Pact as it was explained earlier. Finally, 
the last was to respond the final result of election. They argued that the 
election has been manipulated structurally and systematically because of 
which they cannot win the competition. 
By tracking back the history of Ulama Consensus in Indonesia, it 
must be stated obviously that those were the first time where the 
consensus were held to produce political decisions. According to 
Nasaruddin Umar, a charismatic imam of Istiqlal mosque, there is no 
precedent of Ulama Consensus in the history of Indonesia, be it is 
conducted by NU, Muhammadiyah or MUI, that produced an ijma 
(consensus) of practical politics. This historical fact leads me to conclude 
that religious modes are recently exercised to support political interest. By 
driving religious terminology through political arena, they practically 
induced their struggle with a coercive power as the last model. 
Conclusion 
The relation between religion and state does not need to be 
categorized either in theocracy or secular democracy. As I have alluded 
earlier that they sometimes go beyond the idea of secularism. This is by 
no means that the idea is essentially invalid but the complexity of interplay 
between religion and state in the current political context cannot be 
covered by the notion of secularism. Indonesia is one of the context in 
which the relation cannot be understood through liberal perspective. 
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Though claiming to be a democratic state, religion is not relegated into 
private sphere as it is in Turkey and France. Rather, it is involved even in 
the initial formation of the nation as well as mostly in the process of policy 
decision-making. 
The establishment of MUI in the beginning period of New Order is 
representing the presence of religion in the state realm. It productively 
issued fatwas with regard to many social, economic, and political issues. 
As it is politically aimed to control the role of ulama in a way that PPP is 
created to control Muslim political parties, it showed a model of state 
corporatism in the first period. However, its role was transformed since 
1990s by producing some institutional innovations such as halal food 
certification and Islamic banking. Providing them an amount of funding, 
those two creative projects empower their position before the state to the 
degree that they can contest some of state policies. Since 2005 up to 
present, they used a modern type of authority to keep their influential 
position. These strategies are including mass mobilization, lobbying, and 
coercive authority. 
Of their controversial fatwas, fatwa on golput was recently re-
resonated to energize the democratic culture of Indonesia. Many attempts 
have been exercised particularly in welcoming the 2019 general election 
that is regarded as successfully suppressing the number of golput. Since it 
is precisely in the third period of MUI, they employ their modern authority 
to ensure that their fatwa is going to be implemented in society. A series of 
mass demonstration in National Monument from the purpose of sentencing 
Ahok to changing the existing regime obviously proved the involvement of 
social mobilization tactic. They used also a lobbying approach by, in one 
side, sending one of their leader in the presidential competition while, in 
other side, create a political agreement through Integrity Pact. Finally, 
through a sequence of Ulama Consensus, religious step was also included 
to complement their endeavor by supplementing an aroma of coercion. 
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